The Dialectics of War
The Russian revolution of February-March 1917 was the beginning of the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war. This revolution took the first step towards ending the war; but it requires a secondstep, namely, the transfer of state power to the proletariat, to make the end of the war a certainty. This will be the beginning of a “break-through” on a world-wide scale, a break-through in the front of capitalist interests; and only by breaking through this front can the proletariat save mankind from the horrors of war and endow it with the blessings of peace. It is directly to such a “break-through” in the front of capitalism that the Russian revolution has already brought the Russian proletariat by creating the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.— V.I. Lenin, 1917
In 1917, Lenin was on a mission to convince the people of Russia to carry out a socialist revolution. He correctly argued that World War I, like any war, revealed the contradictions implicit in capitalism. These contradictions would not only empower the Russians to transition towards a socialist system governed by the Soviets, but would allow Russia to be the first break in the capitalist chain inspiring other countries to overthrow their ruling classes as well. As historically distant as this may seem today, at the time, this “break-through” seemed at hand. The German navy was revolting against its ruling class, mutinies and labour strikes became the norm in other European countries, and mass strikes were taking place in Canada, the USA, and Australia. These events brought with them the hope of world peace.
Unfortunately, the Russian Revolution failed to bring about the workers' republic it sought and inspire the global revolution and the lasting peace that was meant to come with it. Instead, the Russian Revolution gave enemies a common cause. Countries originally fighting each other decided it was safer to band together to crush the threat of socialism. They sent their armies to invade Russia and supported various factions of the civil war within it. These events strengthen instead of weaken Lenin’s assessment. World War I did highlight the contradictions of capitalism and revealed the opportunities to progress beyond them, it was just that the global counter-revolution was able to mobilise at a rate faster than revolutionaries.
All wars contain within them, as they did for the Russians, contradictions and the hope that they can be overcome. The current war on Palestine is no different. It has revealed, in sharp focus, several contradictions. The first contradiction is the West’s empty commitment to human rights and individual liberties domestically, as they moved to suppress pro-Palestinian protests, symbols, cultural events, and specific organisations. Internationally, they have rallied to increase their military support and political cover for Israel’s genocide of the Palestinian people. This is in sharp distinction to the mass of workers who have mobilised in favour of Palestinian rights including taking direct action to stop arms reaching Israel. One of the strangest manifestations of these contradictions has been the rediscovery and positive attitudes of Americans towards Osama Bin Laden’s “Letter to America” in which he justifies his attacks on 9/11.
Within the Arab world, and within the countries that have normalised relations with Israel, the war on Palestine has pitted workers against their leaders and the processes of normalisation they have endorsed. In Jordan and Egypt, this opposition has led to clashes with the police. In the countries that have not normalised relationships, the war on Palestine has revealed the emptiness of their threats and posturing and the ruling class’ preoccupation with suppressing the working masses over a confrontation with Israel. In Iraq and Syria, armed groups have targeted American bases signaling the re-emergence and legitimacy of armed struggle against imperialist forces in the region.
All across the world, the war on Palestine has mobilised workers in different degrees in support of the Palestinian’s right to self-determination and resistance. trade unions have promised to not transport war materiel heading to Israel, mass protests abound as does civil disobedience. While perhaps not as deep or intense as the “break-through” caused by World War I — at least not yet — this breakthrough has similar liberatory potential and is connected, like all wars, with the dynamics of global capitalism as I have written elsewhere.
What is done with this liberatory potential, and whether global revolution or counter-revolution dominates, will be determined by the actions of the groups and organisations mobilising around the issue of Palestinian liberation in their respective countries. My objective with this article is not to assess what should be done in a global context, but to look at how the contradictions brought on by the war on Palestine manifest themselves in the specific context of Lebanon and what this should mean for groups and organisations there.
The Lebanese context
It is important to begin with clarity, Lebanon is at war. Any assessment to the contrary is untenable. Since October 8, and in response to the launch of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, groups in Lebanon have attacked Israeli positions south of the border. These attacks have been carried out by non-state actors. The most prominent of these groups is Hezbollah, the religious militia-cum-political party which has monopolised the space of “resistance” in Lebanon since its inception in 1982. They have been joined by various smaller armed groups.
For now, this war remains limited to Lebanon’s southern area. However, fears of escalation continue to grow as Israel’s Defence Minister has threatened that “What we are doing in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut”. At least 80 Lebanese citizens have been killed, including a journalist, and close to 20,000 civilians have had to flee the south from Israel’s shelling and airstrikes.
Contradictions abound
The war on Palestine and Lebanon has revealed several contradictions within the country. At the forefront of these is: how can the Lebanese people, who have themselves suffered under Israeli occupation and their massacres, best show solidarity with Palestinians?
The answer to this question has been reduced to two options. Either, support Hezbollah in their actions against Israel, which means turning a blind eye to 1) the fact that they are a fundamental religious party 2) that they are supported by a foreign power 3) that they acted as the linchpin of counter-revolution during Lebanon’s 2019 uprising to protect Lebanon’s ruling class 4) that they undermined the investigation of the Beirut port explosion. Or, take a principled stance on “sovereignty”, denouncing Hezbollah as a non-state actor inciting and dragging Lebanon into what will undoubtedly be a destructive war which will kill thousands.
The nationalist neutrality of the second choice leaves the question of how, practically, Lebanon can show solidarity with Palestine unanswered. It begs the question, what is the point of a country if it cannot take any concrete steps to stop the genocide of our Palestinian brothers and sisters? What is the point of sovereignty if the concept is only mobilised in opposition to and in the face of other Lebanese who do take concrete action against Israel, but requires nothing from the government when Israel bombs Lebanon or violates its air space as it has done 22,000 times over the last 15 years? What is the point of having a “sovereign” army which is only mobilised to suppress Lebanese protesters or provide protection to the banks which have locked the Lebanese out of their savings for almost four years now? What is the point of sovereignty when it provides nothing but recreate the conditions the Lebanese ruling class needs to continue its looting and pillaging — itself enabled by and permitted by imperialist countries so long as these politicians safeguard Lebanon’s colonial mode of production in the global capitalist system?
Implicit in this neutrality is the very real fear of an expanded war. Israel’s war with Lebanon in 2006 killed more than 1,200 Lebanese citizens and destroyed most of the country's infrastructure. Lebanon has yet to fully recover from that attack, and the 2019 financial crisis which continues today rightfully leaves little appetite for the expansion of the war should full support be thrown behind Hezbollah. However, what this fear obscures is that there is nothing stopping Israel from doing this regardless of Hezbollah’s actions. Israeli spokespeople have made it clear that Lebanon is next on their hit list.
Hezbollah also has to contend with its own contradictions within this war. The party is not a sovereign actor and its precarious position a la internal support following the 2019 failed revolution and the 2020 port blast leaves it cautious of dragging the country into war. It is for this reason that the party’s leader has given two mild speeches which, as opposed to calling for an expansion of the war, as many expected, preached patience and steadfast support of independent Palestinian action.
The party’s religious ideology means it can never garner the support of a popular resistance movement necessary to make such decisions unilaterally or gain political power, even through legitimate means (elections), in a way that would give it a free hand in action. Indeed, Hezbollah’s existence depends on upholding the fragmented nature of Lebanese politics which simultaneously preserves its semi-autonomous (state-within-a-state) legitimacy as the sole representative of “resistance” within Lebanon, allows for its ties with Iran and Syria, and protects it from foreign intervention at the hands of the Americans. It is for this reason that the party correctly identified the October 17 revolution as a direct threat to its existence and resorted to suppressing it by inciting against it and counter-mobilising its supporters in the streets.
This precarious position reveals another contradiction. Being an integral cog in the state machinery and upholding its current configuration means accepting the passing of laws that, for the purpose of enriching the ruling class, contradict a principled stance of “resistance” and encourages imperialist meddling in Lebanon. For example, Hezbollah argued that the Lebanese government should engage with IMF advisors on the topic of restructuring the economy. It also did not block the Lebanese government’s agreement to the US-led settlement of the maritime border dispute with Israel which saw the country forgo its access to critical gas resources.
Practice agency or accept irrelevance, the shadow of October 17
The problem with the above distillation is that it presents a false dichotomy that depends on an understanding of support that remains abstract. “Supporting” neutrality or Hezbollah requires no personal or concrete investment and remains a largely moral and therefore irrelevant stance unless it motivates action. More importantly, it obscures the possibility of other options that hit the nexus of the above contradictions with the hope of eliminating them.
To find such a solution the question that needs to be asked is: Can we do something that simultaneously creates concrete support for Palestine while undermining Hezbollah and the Lebanese political system which it helps maintain? The answer is yes and requires a conceptual double movement, one back in time before Hezbollah existed, and one into the future, reimagining the lessons of October 17.
For the first movement, it is imperative for us to not look at Hezbollah and its monopoly over resistance through an a-historic lens. There was, as hard as it is to remember, a resistance before Hezbollah. This resistance was popular, secular, and largely leftist taking many forms. Its most prominent was the Lebanese National Resistance Front founded to resist Israel’s expanded invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Front allied itself with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, still operating in Lebanon at the time, and remained active until 1999.
The Front has been lost to history for two reasons. First, as it existed during the Civil War, it has been swept under the rug through the practice of collective amnesia encouraged by the current ruling class (the same ones who waged the Civil War) to justify their continued rule. This tendency has been unwittingly reproduced by Lebanon’s new generation of activists who have wholesale turned their backs on any political initiatives or thought emerging from that period effectively throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Second, the front was actively undermined, specifically via political assassinations, by Hezbollah and its allies as they sought to secure a monopoly over resistance in their own image in line with their ideological proclivities.
The Front reminds us that a national and popular resistance is possible. More importantly to the dynamics of today, the Front and its actions were tied to a political program concerning the transformation of Lebanese society away from the sectarian system that still plagues it today — a program not too dissimilar from the aspirations of October 17. It is to our own detriment that we turn our backs on the rich practice and theoretical understanding furnished by that period.
The second movement involves an evolution beyond the moment of October 17. The failed revolution of October 17 laid the groundwork for a thoroughgoing restructuring of the Lebanese polity but quickly crumbled under its own contradiction. Decentralised, it failed to produce the concerted focus needed to challenge and resist counter-revolution. Steeped in liberal hopes of democracy, it failed to consider the power of Lebanon’s already democratic structure to coopt and divert revolutionary energy away from direct confrontation. Its focus on the state as the arena of contention failed to concretize the nascent alternative centres of power (such as revolution tents, unions, and direct action groups) in a way that allowed them to make independent claims for power as it challenged the multiple crises Lebanon is passing through. Despite these weaknesses, October 17 pointed out the real appetite Lebanese people have for fundamental change.
Evolving beyond the revolutionary moment requires a combination of the above two movements contextualised by the reality of war. This volution can be manifested by a decentralised mobilisation taking at its central activity the task of preparing for the possibility of an expanded war. This includes organising to carry out civil defence and armed resistance and directly confronting imperialist presence in Lebanon including embassies, foreign funding and the like. Such a mobilisation undermines Hezbollah’s monopolistic claims, begins to build a sovereignty that can reject imperialist presence in Lebanon (military and diplomatic) beyond the empty “sovereignty” that protects the power structures which maintain and enrich the ruling class, and allows for the popular mobilisation of citizens against these power structures including the banks and state institutions which directly led to October 17 and the following economic crisis.
This type of organisation is not far from my past suggestions of revolutionary organising and directly ties into the international solidarity available to Lebanon and Palestine. It cuts through all contradictions presented and centres agency and hope by opening a second front against imperialism — the immediate mover of Isreal’s actions and its supporters and inspires workers in the Arab world and beyond to emancipatory direct action in their own countries as a part of this global struggle. There is no doubt that such a mobilisation will need to be couched in a wider understanding of change in Lebanon. Unfortunately, that is a task too great for this already sprawling article but is one that must be engaged with seriously.
Do we have the same courage Palestinians have shown?
Short of that (large) outstanding task, the questions that remain after all of this is do we, like the Palestinians, have the courage to undertake a direct confrontation with state power? Do we have the bravery to rekindle the networks of October 17 and the dynamics of the Front and others like it to take our power back? Can we dauntlessly move away from empty moral stances of “support” and embrace a philosophy of action? These are questions every one of us needs to answer.
If you enjoyed reading this article, you can sign up for my newsletter to receive new posts straight to your inbox along with other updates.
